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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DAVID M. BALLS and RICHARD
S. JOHNS II, co-partners,
dba UTAH EXCAVATING,

No.

16934

Defendant - Respondents .

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover
unpaid rentals, pursuant to an equipment rental

agreemen~

in

the amount of $13,889.64, together with interest and attorney's fees and to recover the sum of $127.35 for repair work.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court, sitting without a jury,

ruled that the

equipment lease was as a matter of law a security instrument
and that the Uniform Commercial Code transformed the lease
into a conditional sales contract and that since there was no
compliance with the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to conditional sales contracts, plaintiff could not
recover unpaid rentals.

The court only allowed recovery of

$127.35 for repair costs on the second claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment relating
to rentals and a remand of the action to the District Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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with the direction to enter judgment in the amount of $13,889.64
together with interest, and together with such reasonable attorney's fees as the lower court shall determine.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Arnold Machinery Company (Arnold)
is and was in the business of both selling and leasing equipment (T. 108).

Defendant-respondent Utah Excavating, a part-

nership, was in the excavating business.
a backhoe was needed.

It had a job on which

Arnold had one in inventory and repre-

sentatives of Arnold and Utah Excavating discussed the alternatives of purchasing or renting one (T. 110).

A lease agreement

instead of a purchase agreement is often entered into if the
contractor is not sure how long his work will last (T. 123),
even though financially able to purchase.

For those in the posi·

tion of Utah Excavating, of not being financially able to purchase, entering into a lease is a common transaction (T. 134-

135).
If the backhoe were to be purchased, a twenty-percent
down payment, or approximately $20,000 would have been required
(T. 111).

Utah Excavating did not have the funds for a down

payment, nor were they sure if their work would last long
enough to warrant purchasing the equipment. The evidence was;
Q,

Did you express to their salesman
what your objective was in coming
to them?
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A.

Q.
A.

Yes
What was that?
That we were interested in obtaining a backhoe so that we could use
it to perform work that we had more
or less had committed to us if we
had that type of equipment.
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 169)

A.

We wanted a piece of equipment similar to this because we had work to
do with it. And because of our financial condition, not having sufficient money to make a down payment
and being aware that these kinds of
alternatives to purchase were available, we elected to use that kind of
an arrangement rather than have to
come up with that much capital at
that time in order to get the equipment to put it to use.
(Johns of Utah. :C: xcavating T. 195)

In lieu of buying the backhoe, it was decided that it would
be rented for a long enough period to determine whether or
not the work would last and to permit them to acquire from
the work sufficient funds to make a down payment.

If the

work lasted and if they acquired funds for a down payment,
it was then the intent of the parties that a conditional
sales contract would be substituted for a rental agreement.

**

*They then, of course, decided they
did not have the money for a down payment, nor were they sure if the type of
work they had was going to last for this
two or three-year period. So in lieu of
buying the piece of equipment we then
elected to rent it to them until they
found out if the work was going to hold
out, and also they could use the rental
payments by which to acquire a down payment and then put it on to a conditional
sales contract.
(Byerline of Arnold T. 110, 111)
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A.

The other option is the so-called
lease where we would make an established payment for a given period of time, hopefully with the end
result being that we would then acquire sufficient equity in that
machine to allow us to obtain financing.** *

A.

We could convert to a purchase. We
could actually purchase that machine.
We would have acquired a down payment
through the money that we had paid
over the period of six months, so
that we would then be able to actually purchase that machine.***

A.

Not that I recall. He indicated
that there would be a six-month
minimum. We would have to pay the
six-month payments, and if we desired to continue longer we could,
but it was to our advantage to convert to a purchase as quickly as we
possibly could because of the finance charges, and we were also making payments that were really quite
high, * * *

(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 171)
***But we knew we didn't have the 20
percent, or ten percent required down
payment, so we could see that this was
a viable way for us to obtain the equipment we wanted, to get it right to work,
and have it earn for us the money we
needed to make the down payment so that
we could eventually finance it.
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 172)
Thus, a rental agreement was entered into (Ex. 1-P, T. 112)
instead of a conditional sales contract.

The rental agree-

ment was accompanied by an option to purchase which provided
that rental payments could be applied against the purchase
price.

(Ex. 2-P)

Arnold's experience in rentals such as this

was that only twenty to twenty-five percent of those renting
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equipment exercised their option to purchase (T. 114).
parties treated the transaction as a lease.

The

Arnold paid its

supplier-manufacturer Drott only upon a subsequent sale of
the backhoe to Salt Lake County, whereas it would have had to
pay

Dr~tt

upon execution of the rental agreement, had the

rental been a sale. (T. 161).

Arnold took the depreciation

of the backhoe on its corporate books for the rental period.
(T. 114).

Arnold made major repairs at its expense during

the rental period and, in fact, acquired and paid for parts
needed for such repairs (T. 299).

Utah

Excavatins, instead

of depreciating the backhoe as if it owned it, expensed
rental payments (T. 211).
The parties contemplated that a six-month period
was a long enough one for Utah Excavating both to determine
whether or not their work warranted the purchase of the equipment and to pay rentals in a sufficient amount to enable Utah
Excavating to terminate the lease and enter into a conditional
sales contract applying the rental payments as a down payment
on the conditional sales contract.

Utah Excavating's testi-

mony relating thereto is as follows:
A.

As we discussed this option with
Arnold Machinery, the kind of language that was used was to the effect
that we would go on accruing our
down payment as we were making these
payments towards this so-called lease,
so that we would be able to then at
the end of the six months have sufficient money to make the down payment.

***
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Q.

And the lease would have been terminated and the conditional sales contract would have then been entered
into, right?

A.

That is correct.
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 20S)

Q.

The option not to buy presently, but
to buy six months later, right?

A.

The option to have this piece of
Equipment to use and to accrue money
during the time we were using it
so that we would be able to eventually make this other arrangement,
this purchase.
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 209)

Q.

That may be. Did you feel that you
were bound to ·k '"/( '"/( do anything more
than pay the six-month rental? * * *

A.

That is correct.
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 210)

A.

***But we knew we didn't have the
20 percent, or ten percent required
down payment, so we could see that
this was a viable way for us to obtain the equipment we wanted, to get
it right to work, and have it earn
for us the money we needed to make
the down payment so that we could
eventually finance it.
(Balls of Utah Excavating T. 172)

Q.

You didn't have an intention at the
time you entered into the rental
agreement, and the option agreement,
to continue with that type of agree-
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ment for an indefinite period of
time, did you?
A.

No. We wanted to purchase the machine as quickly as possible. * * *

A.

But we were going to do it for the
six months and then we were going
to pay Arnold Machinery the balance.
(Balls of Utah Excavating T. 268, 269)

Utah Excavating's excavation work did not develop
as it had anticipated, and it became delinquent in rental payments (T. 204).

Arnold requested payment, and its salesman

testified as to collection efforts:
A.

Basically just requests for payment,
and of course they would keep promising us they would have money coming in off of their jobs, and we went
along and worked with them as best we
possibly could and left the machine
out so they could still work it. But
this went on several times.
(Welch of Arnold T. 317)

When the collection efforts failed, Mr. Johns of Utah Excavating concluded that

Utah Excavating was unable to finance

the purchase of the backhoe, and so Utah Excavating did not
attempt to purchase the machine.

He testified:

** *

Q.

When did you wish to exercise
the option, at the end of the six
months?

A.

We had intended to do that. However
at the end of the six months we had
not made six payments. We didn't
feel like we could obtain the finan-
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cing at that time with the little
amount that we had accrued, so we
didn't even attempt to finance the
machine at the end of six months.
(T. 212)
Utah Excavating concluded it would have to "forget it."
The Arnold representative testified:

Q.

All right. State what was said concerning termination, Arnold terminating?

A.

Basically it was that we couldn't
release the machine back to them
unless the back payments were caught
up. That was the basis of all of
the conversations. And we would
work with them the best we possibly
could if he would catch his payments
up.
(Welch of Arnold T. 320)

A.

The last conversation that I finally
had with Mr. Balls, I told him it
was subject to future rental and that
we did have people looking to rent
this machine. And he finally told
me that he did not have the money.
In his words,
lI guess I will have
to forget it. '·
(Welch of Arnold T. 318)

The parties all intended that the conversion of the
lease to a sale would occur six months after the lease was
executed (T. 171, 172, 196, 208, 209, 210).
The parties discussed what would happen if the lease
went beyond six months by one or two months.
that it could go on a little longer.
A.

It was decided

Mr. Johns testified:

No. This was, it was a six-month
agreement, but the way the discussion went at that time if we didn't
feel at the end of six months that
we had enough money accrued into
the thing, or we wanted to pay a
few more months and keep the mach-
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ine before we converted to the
purchase situation, we could have
gone on a little longer.
(T. 237)
A.

We intended to buy the machine at
the end of six months, right.

Q.

At the end of six months. Now as I
recall you said probably Mr. Byerline
indicated that if it went over the
six months by one or two months that
that would be all right. Was there
a conversation to that effect?

A.

Yes.

*

·k ·k

(T. 266)

However, Johns, the partner in Utah Excavating handling its financial affairs did not contemplate at the time the
lease was entered into what the machine would be worth after
the six-month rental period.

He was thinking of conversion to

a conditional sales contract at the end of a 6-month's lease.
He testified:

Q.

Did you form an expectation as to
what the equipment, or an anticipation as to what the equipment, would
be worth after one year?

A.

No.

I

don't recall having done that.
(T. 190)

Utah Excavating became delinquent.

It paid only

$12, 823. 29 (Ex. D9) of the agreed six months' rentals of $23,400.
Had the rentals been paid and the option to purchase exercised,
a conditional sales contract would then have been entered into
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and the lease would have been terminated (T. 112).

The $23,400

rental payments would have been shown as a down payment and the
remaining $72,736.50 would have been the unpaid contract balance amount (T. 86, 132).

(That remaining contract balance

takes into account the cost of repairs and the option charge of
1-1/4% per month, both of which under the option agreement were
to be added to the $92,220 option price, Ex.

2-~)

After Utah Excavating could go no further and had terminated the lease after approximately 8 months (T. 319, 318),
Arnold rented the backhoe to Salt Lake County.

The rental

agreement was accompanied by an option to purchase for $85,000,
plus $850 per month option charge. (T. 160).

The County paid

four months rental totaling $15,600 (T. 154) and then determined
that it wanted to purchase the equipment.

Under its option

agreement it would have had to have paid $85,000 plus an option charge of $3,400, less rental payments of $15,600 or a
balance of $72,800 (T. 121-122).

Instead of exercising its

option to purchase, the County advertised for bids for supplying a backhoe, and Arnold submitted a bid for $66,400 (Ex. 6,
T. 127).

The County accepted this bid as being the lowest bid

for a machine of acceptable quality, and the County paid
$66,400 for the machine.

There thus was no exercise of the

County's option to purchase, which would have entailed the
larger sum to purchase the property.
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The lease to Utah Excavating provided:
Arnold Machinery Company .... hereby
leases to Utah Excavating ... for a
minimum period of six months and,
thereafter until the equipment is
returned or until the lessor terminates the lease, the equipment
hereinafter described, according to
the terms and provisions hereinafter
stated .... (Ex. 1-P)
The Court construed that provision as meaning that
the lease continued in effect until there was a breach by
either party of the terms and conditions of the lease.

The

Court said:
THE COURT:
So what my immediate interpretation
of that, yet it is a six-month lease
but it continued thereafter unless
either of the parties terminates it
according to the terms of the lease
which is stated hereafter in the lease.
Or on the back of the lease.

MR. LOWE:
Is Your Honor construing this lease
as going on forever insofar as Arnold
Machinery is concerned, and at the
whim of the lessee to terminate it
otherwise? I don't think could be a
reasonable construction, Your Honor.

MR. RICHARDS:

I certainly do, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
Just a minute. Just a minute. My immediate construction right now is that
if the parties remain current in their
payments that this lease could have gone
on indefinitely, under the wording of
this particular lease, unless they vio-
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lated one of the provisions hereinafter provided for in the lease.
And
if they violate those provisions then
they have cause or grounds to set it
aside.
I think that was the intent of
the parties.
It appears from the testimony that I have heard in this matter
thus far.
MR. LOWE:
The testimony has always been, Your
Honor, that neither of these defendants
thought that it would, expected that it
would go on for more than six months.
At that point they intended to convert it
into a, not a lease but a conditional
sales contract. And the Court, I think,
should look at those circumstances in
construing whether or not this lease was
intended by the parties to go on forever.
THE COURT:
I think you're correct when you state, of
course, that the testimony is that they
expect to convert it.
But I think under
the terms of the lease, if that expectation didn't materialize, they could have
continued to lease it.
So based on that the Court would allow,
would overrule the objection and allow,
the witness to answer the question.

(T. 311, 312)
The Court then felt that it was a waste of Court's
time to consider the intention of the parties at the time
the equipment lease agreement was entered into that the
option should be exercised in six months.

The Court said:

MR. DIBBLEE:
Well, I mean I didn't, I thought that
that issue was more or less concluded
and there wasn't any sense of wasting
the Court's time.
THE COURT:
I think it really is myself

***
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,1.

The Court thereupon considered not just the cost of
exercising the option to purchase at the expiration of six
months when the parties intended that the option should be
exercised, which was $76,473.46, (T. 90), but over objection
admitted evidence relating to figures one, two and three years
later.

Mathematical calculations were carried out to the

point at which rental payments - had the lease continued long
enough and had rental payments been made - would have exceeded
the option purchase price of $92,220 (T. 90-92).

The court

considered, also over objection, the value of the machine at the
date three years later when rentals would have exceeded the
value of the machine (T. 299-314).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LEASE WAS NOT IN PERPETUITY

The lower court concluded that it deemed the lease to
be one in which the lessee was bound for only six months and
then could terminate at any time without cause, but that the
lessor could only terminate the lease for cause, or that both
parties could terminate only for cause, and if there were no
cause that it would have run forever.
to be a most unreasonable one.

Such a result appears

The pertinent part of the

lease is as follows:
Arnold Machinery Company, Inc., a Utah corporation whose address is 2975 West 21st So.,
Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, hereinafter called the lessor, hereby
leases to Utah Excavating whose address is 4591
Holly Lane, City of Salt Lake, County of Salt
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Lake, State of Utah 84117, hereinafter called
the lessee, for a minimum period of six months
and thereafter until the equipment is returne~
or until lessor terminates the lease, the equipment hereinafter described, according to the
terms and provisions hereinafter stated. (Ex. 1-P)
(Emphasis added).
The lease set forth terms and provisions concerning maintenance, repairs, tire charges, damage to equipment, condition
of the equipment on delivery, defects in equipment, compliance with lease, damage by the elements, indemnification
against loss, insurance, title, disclosure of location, subletting, acceleration of rentals in event of default, repossession, interest, attorney's fees, etc.
cally apply

to the lease

These provisions logi-

during its stated term.

The lower

court illogically construed the phrase "according to the terms and
provisions hereinafter stated" as modifying the verb "termina.tes.

11

Such a strained construction would, after deleting extraneous
words, result in:

"Arnold Machinery hereby leases to Utah

Excavating until the lessor terminates according to the terms
and provisions herein stated."

Such a construction would re-

sult in the default provisions not being applicable during the
stated term of the lease.

A logical construction, which would

give effect to what any lessor and lessee would have contemplated, is that the phrase "according to the terms and provisions hereinafter stated" modifies the vel:b "leas es . "

The

latter construction would, after deleting extraneous language,
result in:

"Arnold Machinery Company hereby leases to Utah
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Excavating according to the terms hereinafter stated.''

A

reasonable construction of the rental agreement is that the
express right to terminate the lease in the various situations of default and remedies provided for in such event are
not in limitation of the lessor's right to terminate after
the minimum period of time of six months, but rather permit
the lessor during the minimum period to terminate in the event
of such defaults.
If such reasonable construction is given the rental
agreement, then the Maryland case relied upon by defendants
United Rental Equipment Company vs. Potts and Callahan
Contracting Company, 231 Maryland 552, 191 Atlantic 2d 570,
574 is neither controlling nor persuasive, because in that
case the Court relied upon the fact that:
The only option given the lessor to
terminate the lease is for enumerated
causes. This is consistent with an extended period of rental payments to be
determined solely by the lessee.
That court reasoned that, if the lessor could not terminate the
lease prior to the time at which lease payments would exceed
the option to purchase price, then the provision of 70A-l-201
(37) would be applicable.

That section provides that a trans-

action is not a lease, but a sale with the creation of a security

interest if the lessee has "the option to become the owner

of the property for no additional consideration or for a nom-
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inal consideration" as set forth in subsection (b) :
An agreement that upon compliance with
the terms of the lease the lessee shall
become or has the option to become the
owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended
for security.
A proper construction of the lease here is that after six
months the lessor could terminate without cause.

Consequently,

Utah Excavating's lease is not such a lease as there involved.
The Maryland case is further distinguishable because
the Maryland court, in determining whether or not the lease
"is intended as security," as provided by the code, determined
that the intent of the parties was that it should continue
until the full

option price had been paid.

The code provides

that "whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case."

In the Maryland case there

was no expressed intention of the parties that the option was
to be

e~ercised

at the end of six months.

Here, both Johns

and Balls of Utah Excavating testified that they intended to
exercise the option then.

(T. 172, 208, 209).

Therefore,

there is no reasonable basis for any ruling that the parties
intended that the option would be exercised at such later
time as the rental payments would have equaled the option
price.

Defendants here argued that the court could have con-

sidered times 10 or 20 years later if such longer period
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were

needed to make rentals equal the ,option price (T. 300).
The lower court's determination should have been what
the parties intended at the time they entered into the transaction.

That intent has been stated by the parties 1 and no

later ruling of law that the lease could have continued forever and the option could have been exercised whenever rentals
exceeded option price is any reflection of what the parties intended.
In the event this Court feels that the Maryland case
is not distinguishable, then we submit that the Maryland case
and this case were erroneously decided, because 1-201 (37) of
the code provides that if "upon compliance with the terms of
the lease" the lessee may.become the owner of the property by
paying a nominal consideration, the transaction is one intended
for security.

Here, even adopting the construction advocated

by Utah Excavating that the lessee may terminate after six
months but the lessor is bound forever (T. 311), the lessee
would only be obligated to make six months' payments.

After

six months, it would have had no obligation to pay if it
wished to terminate.

The "compliance with the terms of the

lease" by the lessee would reasonably relate to a payment of
the rentals the lessee was obligated to make.

At the time of

entering into the rental agreement that obligation was only
to pay the minimum six-month rental, since the lessee could
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then terminate the lease.
was $99,136.50.

At that point, the option price

The agreed rental obligation was $23,400.00,

leaving a balance to exercise the option of $75,736.50, which
is hardly a nominal payment.
There is an exhaustive annotation on "Equipment Leases
as Security Interest Within Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201
II

(37) in 76 ALR 3d 11.

The only case cited relating to a hold-

ing over lease situation is the Maryland case, which at the
most would be persuasive rather than binding upon this Court.
The other cases in the 99-page annotation relate to a fixed
option price at the end of a stated term lease.

Such was the

situation in FMA Financial Corporation vs. Pro-Printers,
U. 2d

~_,590

P. 2d 803.

A reasonable construction of sub-

section (b) is that it applies to a situation in which the
lessee is bound to make payments which equal or exceed the
purchase price, in which event the statute makes the transaction a security interest and subject to the Commercial Code
requirements relating to secured transactions.

The UCC crea-

tion of an artificial situation in which a lease is deemed a
sale should not be extended to cover a situation in which
the lessee is not obligated to pay a sum substantially equal
to the purchase price.
II.

THE PARTIES INTENDED THAT THERE NOT BE
A SECURITY INTEREST

Section 70A-201 (37) provides:
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Whether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each
case; however (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make
the lease one intended for security.
Here the parties considered whether to have a lease or
whether to utilize a conditional sales contract which would
create a security interest.

The parties consciously chose to

enter into a lease instead of a conditional sales contract
and later, if available jobs and financial ability developed
as anticipated at the end of six months, to terminate the
lease and then enter into a conditional sales agreement and
then to create a security interest, and if not the lease could
be terminated.

They therefore did not intend that the trans-

action was a conditional sale with a security interest reserved.
Utah Excavating and the lower court relied upon FMA
Financial Corporation vs. Pro-Printers et
Pacific 2d, 803.

al~-

U2d

~-'

590

That case is distinguishable upon its facts.

In that case there was a firm 60-month lease with an option
price at the end of the 60 months, which was 10% of the cost
of the equipment and 6% of the total lease payments.

This case

is in no way comparable insofar as the relation of the option
price to cost and lease payments is concerned, and, even under
the facts in the FMA case, there was a 3 - 2 decision.
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Various factors influencing the determination as to
whether or not the lease was intended by the parties to be
a conditional sale with a security interest reserved are set
forth in the annotation in 76 ALR 3d:
Option to Purchase
This alone under the code does not indicate a security
interest.
Option to Purchase For No Additional Consideration
This factor is determined as of the date the option
was to be exercised.

Here that date was six months

later when the purchase price was substantial, not
3 years later.

Thus no security interest was intended.

Relationship Between Option Price and Value at the Time
Option Was to be Exercised
Here the parties did not consider any value other
than the value anticipated six months after execution
of the lease, when it was contemplated the option
would be exercised, at which point the option price
was not dispropqrtionate to the value.

Thus no sec-

urity interest was intended.
Absence of Alternative to Exercise of Ootion
At the end of the contemplated six-month period
there was a viable economic alternative open to
Utah Excavating, particularly if it did not have jobs
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available, to terminate the lease and not exercise
the option to purchase, indicating no security interest.
Nature of Lessor's Business
Arnold was in the business of both selling and leasing equipment and not in the business of financing
same as was FMA Financial Corporation, indicating no
security interest.
Lessor's Security Anxiety
Whether or not a security deposit was required for
performance has been considered by some courts as a
factor.

Here there was no security deposit which

would be indicative of no security interest.
Default or Termination Provisions
The existence of various rights given to the lessor
upon default by lessee, as expressly set forth in this
lease, is indicative that there is no security interest.
Tax Consequences
The parties here treated the transaction as a true
lease and not as a security interest in their tax
treatment of the transaction, indicating no security
interest.
The above factors reinforce the conclusion that should
have been reached from the expressed intention of the parties
that a lease and not a security transaction was intended.
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CONCLUSION
The lease by its terms was not in perpetuity, nor was
it intended to be so.

Therefore, 70A-l-201 (37) (b) is inap-

plicable, which provides that a lease is one intended for
security if upon compliance with its terms the lessee has the
option to become the owner for no additional consideration.
70A-l-201 (37) (a), which provides that the inclusion
of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease
one intended as security, is applicable.

The clause in 70A-

1-201 (37) that is controlling is "whether a lease is intended
as security is to be determined by the facts of each case."
Here the expressed intention of the parties that they intended a lease instead of a purchase and that the option was
to be exercised six months after the rental agreement was
entered into should have been accepted by the lower court in
determining "whether a lease is intended as security.u

That

intention was that there should be a lease and not a conditional sale creating a security interest, and that the option
was to be exercised at a time when a very substantial rather
than nominal consideration would have had to have been paid
in order to exercise the option to purchase.

Respectfully submitted,
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